Trump Can’t Bully Latin America Without Consequences

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Analysis Trump Can’t Bully Latin America Without Consequences Aggressive U.S. foreign policy could push regional governments into China’s arms. By Oliver Stuenkel , an associate professor of international relations at the Getulio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo and a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C. Several people, some wearing face masks, walk down the steps of a plane. A Colombian Aerospace Force flight carrying deported Colombians from the United States lands in Bogotá on Jan. 28. Latin America News Agency/Reuters My FP: Follow topics and authors to get straight to what you like. Exclusively for FP subscribers. Subscribe Now | Log In U.S. Foreign Policy Economics United States North America South America January 28, 2025, 3:53 PM Comment icon View Comments ( 0 ) U.S. President Donald Trump celebrated an apparent victory on Sunday when he coerced Colombian President Gustavo Petro to allow the resumption of U.S. deportation flights to the country. Petro had previously announced on X that he had turned away two U.S. military flights carrying deported Colombians, writing that the United States “must establish a protocol for the dignified treatment of migrants before we receive them.” Trump’s Second Term Ongoing reports and analysis Trump and Petro sparred on social media for hours. But the Colombian president was forced into submission after his U.S. counterpart announced retaliatory tariffs of 25 percent on all Colombian goods, set to rise to 50 percent after one week, in addition to sanctions and travel bans on Colombian officials. Crude oil is Colombia’s biggest export to the United States; the South American country is the United States’ second-biggest source of coffee and top provider of cut flowers. A trade war would have been highly detrimental to the Colombian economy—especially ahead of Valentine’s Day. U.S. President Donald Trump celebrated an apparent victory on Sunday when he coerced Colombian President Gustavo Petro to allow the resumption of U.S. deportation flights to the country. Petro had previously announced on X that he had turned away two U.S. military flights carrying deported Colombians, writing that the United States “must establish a protocol for the dignified treatment of migrants before we receive them.” Trump’s Second Term Ongoing reports and analysis Trump and Petro sparred on social media for hours. But the Colombian president was forced into submission after his U.S. counterpart announced retaliatory tariffs of 25 percent on all Colombian goods, set to rise to 50 percent after one week, in addition to sanctions and travel bans on Colombian officials. Crude oil is Colombia’s biggest export to the United States; the South American country is the United States’ second-biggest source of coffee and top provider of cut flowers. A trade war would have been highly detrimental to the Colombian economy—especially ahead of Valentine’s Day. Petro reversed course so far that he offered to send Colombia’s presidential plane to pick up deportees in the United States—a humiliating concession for the leftist leader. Trump supporters celebrated the events on social media. But in the longer term, the sugar highs of bullying the region’s leaders could lead to adverse consequences, including countries banding together against the United States—and the possibility that China may emerge as a more attractive partner. Just one week into the second Trump administration, outrage is mounting across Latin America about the treatment of migrants deported from the United States—many of whom have been convicted of no crime other than illegally entering the country. In addition to Colombia, the Brazilian government on Sunday condemned the “ degrading treatment ” of people on a Jan. 24 U.S. deportation flight and accused the United States of violating a diplomatic agreement on the treatment of deportees. Brazilians who arrived on the U.S. military plane reported threats and assaults by U.S. agents, poor ventilation leading to fainting , shackled hands and feet , and a lack of access to food, water, and bathrooms. Mexico also denied permission for a U.S. deportation flight carried out via military aircraft to land last week. While deportation flights are not new, the Trump administration is transporting some deportees on military aircraft rather than commercial planes or aircraft chartered by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The new development is in response to a recent Trump executive order . It seems likely that the Trump administration is trying to signal tough treatment of deportees to disincentivize future migration to the United States. Deportations will likely remain a point of contention between the Trump administration and governments in the region. The military flights are one of the most visible emblems of a dramatic change in U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America under the new U.S. president. Other changes are even more serious. Since winning the U.S. presidential election in November, Trump has made explicit threats of military action and even territorial annexation. He has also vowed punitive tariffs and visa restrictions if countries do not accept his demands on migration, trade, and limiting China’s influence. Trump has asked Panama to hand over the Panama Canal to the United States and did not rule out using military force to seize it. He also threatened to impose a 25 percent tariff on products from Mexico and a 100 percent tariff on BRICS countries if they supported alternatives to the dollar. (Brazil is a founding member of the BRICS group.) There is a palpable sense of unease in the region about a U.S. president who explicitly defends the Monroe Doctrine —a policy established in 1823 by U.S. President James Monroe to justify U.S. military and diplomatic interventions in the Western Hemisphere. It was widely regarded as a tool of American imperialism, particularly throughout the 20th century. In the short term, Trump’s bullying tactics may bring him some success. A country such as Panama, for instance, which the United States invaded in 1989, is likely to yield to Washington to some extent, just as Petro did. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio is set to visit Panama , along with several other Central American countries, on his first trip starting later this week. That will provide better clues as to how U.S.-Panama tensions might evolve—and what any concessions from Panama City could look like. Even though Mexico is much larger than Panama, its economic dependence on the United States leaves it few options other than complying with many of Trump’s demands—not only vis-à-vis deportees but also on trade or rules to ban Chinese companies. Although Mexico refused a deportation flight last week, it also ended up accepting a record four flights in one day. (Those were chartered—rather than military—planes.) Read More A Texas service member in a bulletproof vest and helmet is seen from behind as he hauls a handle to open a gate in a metal fence that’s about four times his height. A sign on the fence says “Notice: Authorized personnel only.” Trump’s Immigration Orders Will Bring Chaos to the Border Nothing in the history of U.S. border control suggests that the new administration’s approach will be effective. Analysis | Edward Alden In the medium and long term, however, Trump’s heavy-handed approach will likely reduce U.S. influence in Latin America. After all, every leader in the region, even those who generally back the United States, will look at Trump’s strategy vis-à-vis Panama, Colombia, and Mexico and understand the risks of being overly dependent on Washington. As FP’s Stephen M. Walt pointed out last month, “overt bullying makes people angry and resentful. The typical reaction is to balance against U.S. pressure.” It may also produce a rally-round-the-flag effect, allowing leaders to stand up to the United States for political gain at home. Most Latin American governments will thus try to diversify their partnerships, turning to other major powers—especially China but also Russia and Europe—to strengthen their bargaining positions. The more threatening Trump seems to Latin American governments, the more they will try to move closer to other major powers. Sign up for Editors’ Picks A curated selection of FP’s must-read stories. Sign Up By submitting your email, you agree to the Privacy Policy and Terms of Use and to receive email correspondence from us. You may opt out at any time. Enter your email Sign Up ✓ Signed Up You’re on the list! More ways to stay updated on global news: FP Live Enter your email Sign Up ✓ Signed Up World Brief Enter your email Sign Up ✓ Signed Up China Brief Enter your email Sign Up ✓ Signed Up South Asia Brief Enter your email Sign Up ✓ Signed Up Situation Report Enter your email Sign Up ✓ Signed Up View All Newsletters During the Trump-Petro spat on Sunday, Zhu Jingyang, China’s ambassador to Colombia, tweeted that “we are at the best moment in our diplomatic relations between China and Colombia, which have now reached 45 years.” As during Trump’s first term—when the U.S. government attempted to oust Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and was unwilling to rule out military intervention in Venezuela—China will position itself as a reliable and predictable partner for Latin American governments. Beijing seems poised to deepen its ties with the region over the next four years. Given their dependence on Washington, Mexico and Colombia will have less room to maneuver away from the United States. But larger countries in South America will have more freedom to balance U.S. pressure by coordinating their responses or strengthening their relationships with other powers. Brazil, for example, exports more to China than to the United States and Europe combined—and will be better positioned to strengthen ties with Beijing. This shift away from U.S. influence could be aggravated by the fact that Trump’s rhetoric about Latin America almost exclusively frames the region as a source of illegal migration, crime, and drugs. He also claims that it is a launching pad for Beijing to challenge Washington. While demeaning talking points may help mobilize his domestic audience—Trump mentioned Latin America more than any other region in his inaugural address—he has yet to provide clear proposals for how he might strengthen U.S.-Latin America ties, much less an explanation of how Latin America may benefit from U.S. foreign policy. Quite to the contrary: In countries such as Honduras, El Salvador, and Mexico, large-scale deportations have the potential to destabilize labor markets and reduce remittances , an important source of income for some countries in Central America. When he was recently asked about U.S.-Latin America relations, Trump responded : “They need us much more than we need them. We don’t need them.” China, meanwhile, continues to provide Latin America with a clear narrative: that the region can economically benefit from its investments and trade. Although China’s recent growth has been sluggish—and despite that fact that Beijing has been accused of dumping practices —economic opportunity is an intuitive framework for most to follow. China’s geographic distance from Latin America also makes it seem far less threatening than the United States. As Trump was celebrating his election victory last November, Chinese President Xi Jinping traveled to Latin America to participate in a ceremony opening a Chinese-funded deep-water port in Peru. “China is willing to work with the Peruvian side to take the [port] project as a starting point to forge a new maritime-land corridor between China and Latin America,” Xi said at the event. Trump could learn a useful lesson from China’s brief—and ultimately unsuccessful—experiment with “wolf warrior diplomacy.” Starting in 2017 , Beijing abandoned its traditionally careful approach to world affairs in favor of a more aggressive style. In 2020, Li Yang, China’s consul general in Rio de Janeiro at the time, famously attacked then-Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s son Eduardo, a member of Congress who continuously referred to COVID-19 as the “China virus.” Writing in an op-ed in O Globo , Li warned that “should any country insist on being China’s enemy, we will be its most sophisticated enemy!” Predictably, the move not only failed to change Eduardo Bolsonaro’s behavior but backfired politically as Bolsonaro followers began to see criticism by China as a badge of honor. Aware of the damage that wolf warrior diplomacy has done to China’s image, Xi largely backed off from the tack in 2023 . Of course, the pursuit of strategic autonomy is easier said than done for Latin American countries, given the United States’ immense global and regional influence. Armed forces across the region, such as in Brazil, use U.S.-supplied equipment and are keen to cooperate with the U.S. military. The U.S. economy is also stronger today than it was during Trump’s first term—and it remains unclear whether the European Union is willing to ratify the historic trade deal it brokered last December with Mercosur. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has spoken out in favor of a Mercosur-China trade agreement, too, but finalizing it may take time. Latin American countries face an uphill battle to band together against U.S. overreach because of their comparatively low levels of intraregional trade and interconnected infrastructure. Yet there is little doubt that they will seek to strengthen their ties to other large powers to balance against Trump’s hostile strategy. After all, with an unpredictable bully in the room, the old adage holds true: You can never have too many friends. This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage of the Trump administration . Follow along here . This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage of the Trump transition . Follow along here . My FP: Follow topics and authors to get straight to what you like. Exclusively for FP subscribers. Subscribe Now | Log In U.S. Foreign Policy Economics United States North America South America Oliver Stuenkel is an associate professor of international relations at the Getulio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo and a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C. X: @OliverStuenkel Read More On Central America | Colombia | Economics | Migration and Immigration | North America | South America | U.S. Foreign Policy | United States Join the Conversation Commenting on this and other recent articles is just one benefit of a Foreign Policy subscription. Already a subscriber? Log In . Subscribe Subscribe View 0 Comments Join the Conversation Join the conversation on this and other recent Foreign Policy articles when you subscribe now. Subscribe Subscribe Not your account? 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